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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COUR7 OF MASSACHUSETTS. 3
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.'
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO. 5
ACCOUNT.
Account Stated-For what Opened.-After the completion of a build-
ing the owner and the builder had an accounting and settlement, and
the owner, without making any claim for damages caused by delay in
the prosecution of the work, gave his note for the balance found to be
due. Reld, that in the absence of fraud in procuring the settlement,
mistake in making it, or ignorance of his rights when it was made, the
owner could not defend against the note on the ground that there had
been such delay resulting in damages to him: Fickel v. -St. Louis
Chamber of Commerce Association, 80 Mo.
ACTION. See Oficer.
Breach of Contract- Composition with Creditors.-T. made a contract
with H. for the purchase of a large number of shooks, to be delivered
and paid for in' different quantities and at specified 'intervals between
the 1st day of October 1875, and the last day of February 1877. On
the 26th of April 1876, T. wrote to H. not to send him any more
shooks. -Held, that this action amounted to a repudiation of the con-
tract, and it entitled the seller to consider it entirely at an end: Textor
v. Hutchins, 62 Md.
Whether it entitled the injured party to an immediate action to
recover damages in respect to each and every future delivery stipulated
in the.contract, Quaere: Id.
On the 9th of June 1876, T. made a composition with certain of his
creditors, including H., by which he agreed to pay in cash, to every
creditor accepting the agreement, one-fourth of his claim, and to deliver
to him two endorsed notes, each for one other fourth; it being stipu-
lated that said cash and iotes should be accepted by the creditors in
full satisfaction of their respective claims. The claim of H., as stated
by him, was duly settled according to the terms of the composition, and
did not include any damages for the breach of the contract for the
shooks. In an action subsequently brought by H. against T. to recover
said damages, it was held that the action-was barred by the composition
proceedings: Id.
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 112 U. S. Rep.
2 From J. Schaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 62 Md. Rep.
3 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 137 Mass. Rep.
4 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 80 AMo. Rep.
6 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 41
or 42 Ohio St. Rep.
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Conspiracy- Obtaining Judgment in other State.-No action lies by
A. against B. for conspiracy between B. and C. in obtaining a judgment
against A. in an action brought in a court of another state having juris-
diction of the subject-matter and of the parties, in which A. appeared
and answered, but was defaulted, which judgment remains in full force,
and to satisfy which A.'s property in that state was sold: Engstrom v.
Sherb~urn, 137 Mass.
ADMIRALTY.
Charter-Party-Stipulation, as to Sailing.-The words of the charter-
party were "now sailed, or about to sail, from Benizof, with cargo, for
Philadelphia." Held, to require that the vessel was already loaded,
whether she had "sailed" or was only "about to sail." The Wickham,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
AGENT. See Evidence.
ASSIGNMENT.
Tort-Assignment of Cause of Action.-A cause of action against a
railroad company arising under the forty-third section of the Railroad
Law, for double damages for the killing of live stock, cannot be assigned
so as to invest, the assignee with the right to sue: Snyder v. Wabash,
St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 80 Io.
BAILMENT.
Storage-Property subject to Mortgage-Liability of fortgagee.-If a
mortgagor in possession of personal property removes and stores it with
a third person, who has no actual notice of the mortgage, which is
recorded, the mortgagee, who afterwards is informed of the removal and
storing, and expresses no disapproval of the same, is not liable to such
person for the charges for storage, although the storage is necessary for
the preservation of the property, but may maintain an action against
him for its conversion: Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass.
BANK.
Collateral Security for Note-Lien for General Balance.-A savings
bank has no lien upon the surplus proceeds of the sale of stock, held as
collateral security for the payment of a promissory note, for the general
balance due from the maker of the note: Brown v. New Bedford Inst.,
137 Mass.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Alteration-Agreement.-A material alteration in a note, made in
accordance with an agreement between the maker and payee, does not
avoid the note as to the maker, although the change was made some time
after the agreement and without knowledge on the part of the maker
that the agreement had been made effective by the actual alteration of
the note: Wardlow v. List, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
COMMON CARRIER.
Railroad-Excursion Ticket.-Expulsion of Passenger.-The appel-
lant purchased of an agent of the appellee at a reduced rate of fare an
excursion ticket, to be used, between the stations designated, within
three days. including the day of sale. He made the journey in one
VoL. XXXIII.-27
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direction, and after the expiration of the time limited, be attempted to
return on the ticket, which the conductor declined to receive for his
passage, and upon his refusal to pay the fire demanded, he was expelled
from the train. In an action against the railroad company to recover
damages for such expulsion, it was held that the plaintiff's rights were
limited by the ticket, and he was rightly required to leave the train
upon refusing to pay the fare demanded; and after being expelled he
had no right to be readmitted except upon payment of full fare for the
whole distance: Pennington v. Phila., Wil. and Balt. Rd. Co., 62" Md.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Corporation.
CONSPIRACY. See Action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See International Law.
Regulation of Commerce-Duly of fifty cents for each Foreign Passen-
ger.-The Act of Congress of August 3d, 1882, "to regulate immigra-
tion," which imposes upon the owners of steam or sailing vessels who
shall bring passengers from a foreign port into a port of the United
States a duty of fifty cents for every such passenger not a citizen of this
country, is a valid exercise of the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations: Head Money Cases, S. C. U. S., Oct.' Term, 1884.
Though the previous cases in this court on that subject related to
state statutes only, they held those statutes void on the ground that
authority to enact them was vested exclusively in Congress by the con-
stitution, and necessarily decided that when Congress did pass such a
statute, which it has done in this case, it would be valid : Id.
The contribution levied on the shipowner by this statute is designed
to mitigate the evils incident to immigration from abroad by raising a
fund for that purpose, and it is not, in the sense of the constitution,
a tax subject to the limitations imposed by that instrument on the gen-
eral taxing power of Congress : Id.
CORPORATION.
Mortgage of Charter-Exemption from Taxation.-An act incorpo-
rating a railroad company authorized a mortgage of its "charter and
works" and exempted it from certain taxation. After a foreclosure sale
under such a mortgage and a reorganization of the company, Held, that
the franchises embraced in the mortgage were limited to those which
had been granted as appropriate to the construction, maintenance,
operation and use of the railroad as a public highway and the right to
make profit therefrom; that the exemption from taxation did not extend
to the reorganized corporation, and that the right of the purchasers at a
sale under the mortgage to organize as a corporation, even if it had been
conferred in express terms in the charter, would be a right to so organ-
ize according to such laws as might be in force at the time of the actual
organization, and subject to such limitations as they might impose:
Memphis Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
Foreign Corporation- Suit by-?eceiver-Dhssolution.-A fire insur-
ance company incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania is entitled
to bring an action.in a Maryland court, for the use of the receiver of
such company, to recover ftom a Maryland policy holder assessments
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upon his premium note where the suit is not brought by such receiver
in his official capacity: I ycomizg Fire Ins. Co. v. Langley, 62 Md.
Although it is settled law that a corporation must dwell in the place
of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty, yet it may
do business in all places where its charter allows and local laws do not
forbid ; and in the absence of such prohibition by local laws, may insti-
tute suits in the courts of states other than those under whose laws it
has been established: Id.
By the decree of a court in Pennsylvania a receiver was appointed
for a fire insurance company created under the laws of that state. The
decree also declared the company to be dissolved, but at the same time
it'referred to the act of assembly under which it was passed. That act
provided that when an insurance corporation is dissolved the court
decreeing such dissolution may appoint a receiver to take charge of its
effects and collect the debts and property due and belonging to it, "with
power to prosecute and defend suits in the name of the corporation, or
otherwise, and to do all other acts which might be done by such corpo-
ration, if in being, that are necessary for the final .settlement of the
unfinished business of the corporation." In an action in Maryland
brought in the name of the corporation for the use of the receiver, it
was held that the decree of dissolution was no bar to the action : Id.
DAMAGES. See Egnity.
EQUITY.
Jurisdiction-Trespass-Damages.- .A court of equity has no inhe-
rent power to ascertain the amount of damages by reason of tortious acts
unattended by profits to the wrongdoer. There must be some joint
interest, or interest in common of the parties in the property for a court
of equity to assess the damages: Atlantic, &c., Coal Co. v. .Marland
Coal Co., 62 Md.
In a case of trespass where no such relations exist, there is no ground
upon which a court of equity can set up any other rule of damages than
that which prevails at law: Id.
The right to maintain the action of guare clausumfregit exists in this
state, whether the defendant committed the trespass unwittingly, or wil-
fully and wantonly: Id.
The owner of adjoining property is held to know the boundaries
between him and his neighbor. If he has made a mistake bona fide as
to his title or boundaries, in mining coal, the lowest measure of damages
applicable is the value of the coal immediately upon its conversion into
a chattel, without abatement of the cost of severance: Id.
If the trespass has been committed through negligence or design,
punitive damages in addition may be recovered: Id.
An unwitting trespasser, merely as such, could not change the amount
of his liability by simply changing the forum. No lower measure of
damages for trespasses not negligent nor wilful could be substituted
in equity for that fixed at law on general principles for such tres-
passes: Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
The Opinion not a part of the Record.-Rule 8, sect. 2, of the
Supreme Court of the United States requiring a copy of any opinion
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that is filed in a cause to be annexed to and transmitted with the record,
on a writ of error or appeal, does not make the opinion a part of the
record : Enaland v. Gebhardt, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
ESTOPPEL.
Cosent to building of Wall-AMistake of Fact.-If A. is informed by
B., who owns land adjoining that of A., that B. proposes to erect a wall
on his own land at his own expense, and A. assents that the wall shall
be built according to the line of B.'s land as established by the survey
of C., A. is not estopped to maintain a writ of entry against B., after
the wall has been built, for land erroneously included in such survey,
if, in assenting to the building of the wall, he acted under a mistake of
fact, and not with intent to mislead B.: Proctor v. Putnam Mach. Co.,
137 Mass.
EVIDENCE.
Agent's Declarations and Verbal Acts.-The declarations of an agent
are admissible as evidence against his principal only when made while
transacting the business of the principal and as a part of the transaction
which is the subject of inquiry. Hence, where the baggage-master of
a railway company, while away from the baggage-room of the company
and engaged in the transaction of his private business on his own prem-
ises, gave directions to a stranger with reference to the delivery of
baggage, Held, that they were not binding on the company: City
of Chillicothe v. Raynard, 80 Mo.
EXEapTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
E-xecutor as Trustee.-The fact that the same person is both trustee
and executor under the will, will not operate to enlarge, transpose or
transfer the powers from one capacity to the other, but the powers
assigned to each capacity must be executed by the party in the capacity
to which the powers are assigned: Long v. Long, 62 Md.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Disappearance of Husband-Presumption of Death-Partition-Pay-
meat of Share to Administrator-Presumption of Payment to Wife for
her Sutport.-In 1864, Henry First, then a resident of Knox county,
Ohio, absconded, deserting his wife and four children, and nothing was
ever heard of him in _that community until he reappeared in 1880. In
1873 land in said county belonging to him, in common with others, was
partitioned at suit of co-tenants, and his share of the proceeds came to
the custody of Brent, the clerk of the Common Pleas. In 1879. with his
wife's assent, the probate court appointed Bennett administrator of W.
H. First, supposing that to be the true name of the absentee, and he
collected from Brent $174.21, the said proceeds of said partition. In
October 1880, First demanded said sum from Brent, and on his refusal
to pay, brought suit. Held: 1. In the absence of a showing to the con-
trary, the presumption, from the facts stated, is that the money was paid
to the wife, who was entitled to a year's support, on the supposition that
her husband was dead. 2. As she was entitled to support out of his
property during his life, First's conduct estops him from claiming that
the payment to her was unauthorized: Brent v. First, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
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INFANT.
Suit -Prochein Ami-Attorey-Appeal- Costs.-An infant brought
.a suit by her prochein ami, in a court of law. Afterwards she employed
an attorney and requested him to dismiss the suit, which was accordingly
done. A motion was subsequently made in the name of the infant by her
prochein ami, asking the court to strike out the entry of 1 off," which
had been made in the case, and reinstate it on the docket for trial. On
appeal from the order of the court overruling this motion, it was held:
1. That the infant, until she reached the age of twenty-one years, was
incompetent to appoint an attorney or to take any step in the suit which
could bind her rights. 2. That the appointment of an attorney by her
being nugatory, his dismissal of the suit was simply void. 3. That the
court below was therefore in error in refusing to reinstate the case.
4. That an appeal could be taken from such refusal. 5. That it was
not in the power of the infant, after attaining the age of twenty-one
years, to ratify and approve the act of her attorney. Where an infant
sues byprochein am , the latter is the only person who is authorized to
prosecute the suit, and is responsible for the costs. While it is compe-
tent for the court, after th-e infant has arrived at the age of twenty-one
years, to discharge the prochein ami, and give the infant control over
her suit, it must make such equitable order as will protect the prochein
ami from costs already incurred and relieve her from liability in the
future: Wainwright v. Wilkinson, 62 Md.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Enforcement of Treaty-Effect of Act of Congress upon same.-A
treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations, and depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor and the interests of
the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction
becomes the subject of international reclamation and negotiation, which
may lead to war to enforce them. With this judicial courts have nothing
to do: Head Money Cases, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
But a treaty may also confer private rights on citizens or subjects of
the contracting powers which are of a nature to be enforced in a court
of justice, and which furnishes a rule of decision in such cases. The
Constitution of the United States makes the treaty, while in force, a
part of the supreme law of the land in all courts where such rights are
to be tried: Id.
But in this respect, so far as the provisions of a treaty can become the
subject of judicial cognisance in the courts of the country, they are sub-




Foreign Cause of Action.-Whether a suit brought in one state on a
cause of action originating in another state is barred by limitation, is to
be determined by the law of the state where the suit is brought: Stir-
ling v. Winter, 80 Mo.
MORTGAGE. See Bailment.
Collateral Security-Renewal of Debt without consent of Mortgagor.
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-A married woman mortgaged her property to secure the note of her
husband given for the purpose of raising money to pay the debt of a
lumber company, of which he was president. The money was raised by
loan from an insurance company, on the note of the lumber company
at one year, with the mortgage as collateral thereto, and the insurance
comp~any had knowledge that the mortgaged property was designed by
the mortgagor to serve as surety for the payment of the loan. Without
the mortgagor's knowledge or consent, the note of the lumber company,
at the end of the year, was renewed, and soon thereafter surrendered,
cancelled and marked "paid" upon the books of the insurance company,
and a new note, with other and different parties, was substituted in its
place, and twice renewed, and then extended, the mortgage being all
the while held as collateral. ield, that the mortgage was released:
People's Ins. Co. v. McDonnell, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Negligence.
Negligence-Fireworks-njury to Spectator.-A city which under-
takes the celebration of a holiday, under the authority of the Pub. Sts.
c. 28, § 13 (which provides that the city council may appropriate money
for such a purpose), exclusively for the gratuitous amusement of the
public, is not liable to an action by one who sustains personal injuries
through the negligence of servants of the city in discharging fireworks
for the purposes of the celebration : Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass.
NEGLIGENCE. See tunicipal Cororation.
Independent Contractor-Snpervision of Owner.-A contractor entered
into a written contract with the trustees of an estate, by which he agreed
" to take down the entire building known as the A. house, belonging
to said trustees, or so much thereof as the trustees may request;" and
which also provided as follows: "All of said work to be done carefully,
and under the direction and subject to the approval of the trustees."
Hel, that the trustees were liable for injuries occasioned to a third
person by the negligence of the contractor, or of his servants, in doing
the work named in the contract; Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass.
independent Contractor-Supervision of Work- Municipal Corpora-
tion.-Where a city contracted for the construction of a cistern eighteen
feet wide and twenty feet deep, in a street, and before the cistern was
completed a horse fell into it and was killed for want of sufficient pro-
tection around and over the excavation to guard animals in the proper
use of the street from danger. J7eld, that the city was liable for the
loss of the horse, although it did not reserve or exercise any. control or
direction over the manner of doing the work, except to see that it was
done according to specifications which were a part of the contract: City
of Circle ville v. ending, 41 or 42 Ohio ,St.
Contributory Negligence- Crossing Track-Presumption that Company
is obeying Ordinance.-When a city council, by ordinance, prohibited
the running of railroad trains through its limits at a rate of speed greater
than that named in the ordinance, a traveller upon a street, in such city,
crossing the track of a railroad, has a right to presume that the com-
pany will conform to such regulation. If he acts in accordance with
such presumption, in the absence of knowledge of the fact that the rail-
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road company is exceeding such limit in running a train, it will not of
itself be an act of negligence: Meek v. Penn. Co., 38 Ohio St. 632, fol-
lowed and approved. The trial judge did not err in substantially
directing the jury to take into consideration all the objects and things
at the crossing of the railroad and street, and to consider what was
done by the deceased under all these circumstances, and in saying
that if they found that his action was that of a person of ordinary
prudence, they must also find that lie was not guilty of contributory
negligence: Hart v. Devereux, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
Contributoryr Negligence-4depentdent Contractor-Negligence of
Owner-artnershup -Where there is evidence tending to prove neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant, and also evidence from which the
proper inference to be drawn as to fault on the plaintilfs part is doubt-
ful, it should be submitted to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff
was injured by his own fault or that of the defendant.: Kellg v. Rlowell,
41 or 42 Ohio St.
A contractor agreed with the owner of a mine to do certain work therein,
the owner engaging to furnish and put up such props or supports for the
roof of the mine as would render the miners secure, whenever notified by
the contractor that the same were necessary. Held, that although such
notice from the contractor may not have been received by the owner, the
owner, if he had actual knowledge that such supports were necessary,
became liable in damages to an employee of the contractor, who, without
negligence on his own part, had been injured while at work in the mine,
through the want of such supports for the roof. If the overseer of the
mine acted in behalf of a partnership of which he was a member, and
the mine, at the time of the injury of the emloyee, was in the occupa-
tion of the firm, and the work was being done therein for the firm's use
and benefit, the partnership will be liable for the neglect to furnish
and put up the supports necessary for the safety of the contractor's
employees: Id.
OFFICER.
Public Porter-Action on his Bond.-A person whose baggage has
been lost through the negligence of a public porter licensed by the city
as such, may maintain an action on a bond given by him to the city pur-
suant to charter and ordinance, for the faithful performance of the
requirements of the ordinance and the safe delivery of all articles
entrusted to his care: City of Chillicothe v. Raynard, 80 'Mo.
PARTNERSHIP. See Negligence.
POSSESSION.
Estates for Life and in Remainder-Adverse Possession.-The pos-
session of a life tenant is not adverse to the estate of the remainderman,
and he cannot, by his declarations, acts or claim of a greater or different
estate, make it adverse, so as to enable himself or others claiming under
him to invoke the statute of limitations: Keith v. Keith, 80 Mo.
Acceptance of a deed from the true owner granting a life estate to the
acceptor, with remainder over, waives any rights the latter may have
acquired by a former adverse possession, and precludes him and those
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claiming under him from asserting that his subsequent possession is
adverse as against the remainderman: Id.
PRACTICE.
Trial by Court without Jtry--Review of Questions of Law- Waiver
of Jury.-In an action at law, submitted to the decision of the circuit
court, waiving a trial by jury, in which the record does not show the
filing of the stipulation in writing required by section 649 of the Revised
Statutes, this court, upon bill of exceptions and writ of error, cannot
review rulings upon the admission or rejection of testimony, or upon
any other question of law growing out of the evidence, but may deter-
mine whether the declaration is sufficient to support the judgment:
Bond v. Dustin, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
The filing of a stipulation in writing, waiving a jury, under section
649 of the Revised Statutes, is not sufficiently shown by a statement in
the record or in the bill of exceptions, that "the issue joined by consent
is tried by the court, a jury being waived," or that "the case came on
for trial by agreement of parties, by the court, without the intervention
of' a jury:" Id.
PRESUmpTION. See Husband and Wife.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier; Negligence.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Suit on Administrator's Bond.-Where the bond of an administrator is
by law taken to the state, but is held for the security of persons interested
in the estate of the deceased, a suit thereon, so fur as the jurisdiction
of the United States Circuit Court is concerned, must be treated as though
the person for whose use the suit is brought was alone named as plain-
tiff: .ar/yland v. Baldwin, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
REPLEVIN. See Tax.
SET-OFF.
Setting off Joint Judgment against Separate Note.-The maker of a
separate note in suit who holds an overdue joint note made by the
plaintiff and another who are both insolvent, may, in equity, set off
the joint demand. The holder of a promissory note who took it after
macurity holds it subject to every objection, including equitable set-off,
to which it was subject in the hands of his assignor. The merger of a
debt into judgment is not so perfect in equity as to preclude the judg-
ment-creditor from resorting to the original demand and the relations
of the parties to it, for the purpose of enabling him to disclose and
assert an equitable set-off: Baker v. .Kinsey, 41 or 42 Ohio St.
SUBROGATION.
Deed of Trust-Satisfaction by Stranger.-Where a land owner, to
save his land, pays a note secured by a deed of trust executed by a
former owner, upon which he is not legally liable, the debt is not thereby
extinguished; he is subrogated to the rights of the holder as against the
maker: Allen v. Dermott, 80 Mo.
